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Preface
The European Union's decision to create a military capability is a significant event in the Union's common security and foreign policy. For me, as a Swedish officer, it felt natural to do my research on this topic, since it marks the beginning of a new era for the Swedish Armed Forces. As a militarily non-aligned state, Sweden will for the first time, be part of a permanent structure that handles military matters on a daily basis. The EU has chosen a structure that somewhat emulates NATO's, with a Policy and Security Committee, a Military Committee and a Military Staff. Diplomats and officers in these bodies will be working closely with their NATO counterparts. So, without becoming a member of the Alliance, Sweden has been drawn closer to 
Abstract
The European Unions decision to create a military capability is a first step towards a common European defense. However, this development is not without problems. The NATO members who are not EU members regard the project with a somewhat skeptical view. They are concerned that an independent force outside NATO's planning system will deplete the alliance rather than augment it. France is the greatest advocate for the EU's political independence and Turkey is the most negative NATO member, blocking EU's proposed mechanism for cooperation between the EU and NATO. The reasons for these two controversial standpoints are to be found in domestic politics rather than foreign affairs in the case of France and in the legitimate security concerns on the Turkish part. There is also the question about the actual capability of the EU force. Several important shortfalls have been identified, requiring US and/or NATO assets to fulfill all of the stated Petersberg tasks. The solution to these problems lies in increased military spending and the enlargement of the EU.
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Introduction
The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defense, should the European Council so decide.
-The Amsterdam Treaty on the European Union
Thesis statement and research questions
The creation of a European military capability is a first step towards a common European defense. In part, this is a reaction to the EU inability to employ the military instrument of power. Thus far the EU has relied upon European diplomacy and economic ties that have been supported by a strong US military presence to give credibility to European power and influence, albeit under the auspices of NATO.
First, how will the EU's emerging military capability affect NATO and the USA?
Second, referring to figure 1, how will the three different groups of member states be handled (EU and NATO members, EU members and NATO members)? Third, how will this development affect actual capabilities? Finally, will the EU rely on the US to supply certain capabilities? 
"INTERLOCKING INSTITUTIONS"
NATO
Feira
The Portuguese Presidency responded with a report at the European Council in Feira, June 2000. As requested, the report dealt with the Headline goals and the creation of working groups between the EU and NATO, pending the implementation of a permanent framework. In addition, proposals for the co-operation with non-EU NATO members and candidates for accession to EU were made. These proposals included an invitation to commit additional forces to the future EU military capability and for the contributing states to gain access and take part in the operational planning. However, the EU reserved the right to unilaterally make the political decision whether to deploy forces or not in a crisis action. This standpoint is one of the most controversial against NATO and the US. cooperation with NATO and other states was adopted.
The Petersberg Tasks 4
Originally agreed upon by the WEU member states in 1992 at a meeting in Bonn, Germany, these tasks includes the full range of humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. Tied in to the EU headline goals, these are the tasks that the committed forces are supposed to be able to handle by 2003.
Problem areas
When the otherwise cautious and rather slow moving leaders of the EU put the CEFSP and the development of a military capability in high gear, things started to move too quickly. Almost like a snowballing effect the creation of the political and military staff functions materialized. Left behind was the serious look at the reasons for why the 
Issues analysis and discussion
The United States will not depend on individuals in key positions to ensure that ESDP does not split the Alliance. It will want to establish institutions and processes that will lock the European effort into a transatlantic framework.
-Stanley R. Sloan
The Transatlantic link Implications for the US
For the United States this development is like a two edged sword. While the US has demanded that the European members of NATO take more responsibility for its own continent, they risk loosing influence if this is achieved through the EU rather than through NATO. The US was instrumental in launching the project that would strengthen 
Figure 2 US Force Reduction in Europe
The problem lies more in the fact that the EU has chosen not to use the existing NATO structure, but rather created its own similar structure exclusive for its member states. This means that the US doesn't have as much influence in the decision making process as it is used to have in NATO. While the US clearly has pointed out it's continued interest in European security and defense issues, this has been looked upon with skeptical eyes by certain European NATO members. A common observation has been -first you tell us to take more responsibility for our own continent, but when we tell you how we intend to do it (i.e. through the EU) you tell us that's not the way we think you should do it.
Another source of dispute is the treatment of the other NATO members who are not members of the EU. The Clinton administration proposed a common forum for all 23 states (NATO and EU) to ensure transparency and participation for all. 2 While the EU did not formally reject this proposal, the union preferred to submit its own proposed mechanism for cooperation with NATO. Unfortunately, this proposition was not accepted at the NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs meeting in Brussels, December 2000.
According to several interviews with senior political and military leaders in both Washington D.C. and Brussels, the Turks were under considerable pressure from the US.
Despite that President Clinton both wrote and later talked to his Turkish counterpart on the telephone, 3 the Turkish government elected to block the proposal. The primary reasons for the Turkish standpoint are discussed later in this chapter. While this is viewed by the EU as a temporary setback it does point at some of the problems associated with this new role for the EU.
Implications for Europe
For the European states, this is a very complex development. It entails an area that for long has been considered out of bounds. Despite the recurring attempts to incorporate a military dimension, the EU has functioned as a solely civilian organization since 1957.
All the previous attempts to put some muscle behind the EU's word in world politics Europe as a whole. This is one reason why the EU has invited third party countries to participate in EU led operations, augmenting the forces committed by the member states.
Arguably, this will be one of the most difficult tasks the Union has undertaken. The decision to embark on such a journey is dictated more by real politics than by the most wanted solution. Since the four neutral or militarily non-aligned member states can veto any development that would be to hard for the domestic voters to accept, the chosen path is the one of least resistance. However, while collective defense against a perceived threat from the Soviet Union was the main reason for the Brussels Treaty, it remains to be seen how strong the commitments to non-Article V operations really are. Certainly, the WEU has carried out some successful operations during the 90's. In those cases, the member states came together on a case by case basis and accepted to provide forces for these low threat missions. In future EU-led operations it might be easier to support the mission politically but harder to justify sending the nation's sons and daughters in harms way, achieving objectives that are admirable but not enough domestically rooted.
EU
In one hand, by adopting most of the WEU functions, structure and personnel, the EU has been drawn closer to NATO. On the other hand, by creating a separate and somewhat different structure, the EU has purposely distanced itself from NATO. This is also has the aptitude to do so. Perhaps less casualty adverse than its fellow NATOcountries, Turkish participation in EU-led operations would be preferable. This capability, coupled with the deciding vote on whether to let the EU in to the NATO planning system, will make it almost impossible for the EU leaders to ignore Turkey and force them to take a hard look at the Turkish membership application.
Turkey is also possibly the only NATO member that sees an imminent threat to its own territory. With Eastern Europe being relatively stable, the Asiatic part of Turkey is the most unstable region that borders a NATO member. Therefore, Turkey stands to lose the most, should forces otherwise available to NATO, be tied up in an EU operation up to a 4000 km radius of Brussels. Should these forces be needed to honor an Article V commitment in NATO's southern flank, this will naturally take precedence over a EU peacekeeping mission. Needless to say, it takes some time to redeploy forces that need to be shifted from one theatre to another. Turkey will most likely need some sort of assurance that this isn't going to happen. Furthermore, since Turkey has pledged considerable forces to the EU force, they will need to be let in at the decision 
Effects On Actual Capabilities General
Regardless of the number of forces committed by the member states at the 
Land Forces
The land forces pledged by the member states at the Capabilities Commitment Conference amounted to more than 100,000 people. This should not be seen as a willingness to commit more then what was agreed on, but rather a surplus needed to meet the goal of one year's sustainability, since a lot of the forces would only do 6-month rotations. The forces consist of a wide variety of forces, everything from armor to signals and are deemed enough to meet the requirements for all of the Petersberg tasks. 11 The weakness of the committed land forces are not to be found in the composition, but in the above mentioned lack of mobility and interoperability
Naval Forces
A similar variety applies to the committed naval elements. About 100 ships were contributed in all fashions, from destroyers to submarines. Again, this is more than required, but probably needed for the sustainability of a longer operation like a blockade or a mine clearing operation. The reason for this limitation lies in the fact that the European navies are largely brown water navies with limited endurance and supplies.
The smallest number of assets was pledged in the field of amphibious forces. Many states simply have very few or no amphibious forces to commit.
Air Force
Regarding air assets, approximately 400 combat aircraft were committed. Among these forces, there was less variety. The European Air Forces consist mainly of tactical fighters, which leads to a shortage of strategic air assets such as large transport aircraft, tankers and airborne radar. Another limited asset is tactical reconnaissance aircraft.
Many states have cut their resources in this field to a minimum or nothing at all. This fact also proved to be a limiting factor during operation ALLIED FORCE. Furthermore, the European stockpiles of weapons are much smaller than the US one's. Of the all the munitions used in Kosovo, the Europeans contributed with only a fraction compared to the US. Such a shortage of weapons could prove to be a limiting factor in a tough peacemaking operation.
US/NATO assets
The shortfalls that was identified and where US and/or NATO assets would be needed lies in the following sectors: Command and Control for air and naval forces, Intelligence, Surveillance, Targeting and, Strategic Air and Sealift and Logistics. 12 The
Collective Capability Goals-process, to correct these shortfalls, has started and it has the highest priority during the incumbent Swedish Presidency. The results and the way ahead will be discussed again at the European Council in Gothenburg, June 2001.
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However, for these issues to be addressed correctly, a more firm structure than the existing ad-hoc working groups between the EU and NATO would be beneficial. The proposed permanent co-operation structure would help to solve some of the problems associated with this process. 14 With the implementation of a permanent structure, a joint EU-NATO review with full transparency and participation of all member states would be possible. Both organizations would benefit from such a review, making it possible to address common shortfalls in a more rational and economic way.
Required restructuring
As 
Conclusion and summary
The Union cannot see its status reduced to that of NATO subcontractor any more than the Alliance can be treated as a secondary organization in matters of European security.
-Nicole Gnesotto
Summary of findings
The two key actors in the development of an EU military capability are France and Turkey. If the French keep up with their attempts to distance the EU capabilities too much from NATO, the alliance isn't going to lend its much needed hand in planning and augmenting the EU capabilities. As long as the Turks continue to block the proposed cooperation-mechanism between NATO and the EU, every attempt to conduct independent EU operations are likely to fail.
As far as actual military forces go, a long overdue transformation from stationary homeland defense to deployable and versatile units are much needed. Such a transformation needs funding and the political will for these remains to be seen. Another open question is how the new Bush administration will treat this new addition to the transatlantic security framework. As previously alluded to, this will have to wait a few more months until the new NSS is published.
Principal conclusions restated
This development is the first step towards a common European defense. To think that neighboring countries, who share a common foreign and security policy and that exercise and conduct Peace Support Operations together, wouldn't stand by each other in times of a defensive war against an intruder, is not feasible. Another important insight is that the EU has realized that it was in fact partially -toothless". The union lacked the military instrument of power. While the EU has been exercising the other instruments of power, diplomacy and economics, for quite some time it finally became clear that a CFSP without the military might to back it up wasn't credible.
However, the European approach of developing military capability before policy is fundamentally flawed and will result in a lack of credibility, as Cold War forces are restructured within the EU to address internal power struggles amongst Europe's elite.
The politicians have hidden behind the American military umbrella for too long and appear unable to direct a coherent policy review process.
The politicians have effectively turned the problem over to the military, but civilian control of the military will ensure that funding is not forthcoming to address their legitimate concerns, particularly regarding capability shortfalls such as rapid sealift assets, tanker support and a truly integrated C4I infrastructure.
For the EU it is absolutely necessary to reach an agreement with Turkey. The solution to this issue must come from within the EU. The EU cannot look to the US to -deliver" Turkey. How big of concessions that's needed remains to be seen, but anything short of the craved full membership will need some serious efforts on a bilateral level to appease the Turks. With the right attitude towards Turkey, this may not be such a big problem after all. Accepting Turkey's legitimate security concerns with their Asian neighbors and treating them like the equal NATO member that they are will probably help solving this problem. However, if any of the EU members chose to veto all Turkish involvement for domestic reasons, the EU will have to find a new approach towards NATO.
Equally important for the EU is to curb the French ambitions to become the most valuable player of the union, possibly using such a status in an attempt to embark the EU on a secessionist path towards the US. Luckily, such a development would never be accepted by the British and probably not by the Germans either.
1 The other members of the EU must let France understand that they will give the French some latitude, but also clearly state where the non-negotiable boundaries are. These borders include, but are not limited to, the redeployment of all US troops in Europe, the total revisal of NATO chain of command and ultimately breaking the transatlantic link. Nobody, not even France has anything to gain from a development that weakens or destroys NATO.
Future development
The three biggest challenges ahead are the solutions of the identified shortfalls in capability, the relationship with NATO and the enlargement process. Much work is needed in these areas, but if these three issues can be resolved to the satisfaction of all states concerned, then the development of an EU military capability will succeed. If not, it is doomed to fail. In 1970, in Luxembourg, the Six countries adopted the "Davignon" Report, which marked the beginning of European Political Cooperation (EPC). That cooperation related exclusively to foreign policy and its purpose was to ensure mutual understanding and to strengthen Member States' solidarity on major international policy problems. EPC could not be extended beyond the economic aspects of security issues. 
Notes
Amsterdam
In 1997, with the conclusion of the Amsterdam Treaty revising the Treaty on the European Union, WEU was drawn closer to the EU. WEU's role as providing the EU with access to an operational capability was confirmed, the Petersberg tasks were incorporated into the EU Treaty and the possibility of the integration of WEU into the EU, should the European council so decide was mentioned. 
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